Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
Electrical Engineering & Computer Science
Faculty Publications

Electrical Engineering & Computer Science
Department

7-2012

On Privacy of Encrypted Speech Communications
Ye Zhu
Cleveland State University, y.zhu61@csuohio.edu

Yuanchao Lu
Cleveland State University, y.lu@csuohio.edu

Anil Vikram
Cleveland State University, a.vikram@csuohio.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/enece_facpub
Part of the Digital Communications and Networking Commons, and the Electrical and Computer
Engineering Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!

Publisher's Statement
© 2012 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained
for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material
for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or
redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other
works.
Original Citation
Ye Zhu, Yuanchao Lu and A. Vikram, "On Privacy of Encrypted Speech Communications," Dependable and
Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 9, pp. 470-481, 2012.

Repository Citation

Zhu, Ye; Lu, Yuanchao; and Vikram, Anil, "On Privacy of Encrypted Speech Communications" (2012). Electrical
Engineering & Computer Science Faculty Publications. 221.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/enece_facpub/221
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Electrical Engineering & Computer Science
Department at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electrical Engineering & Computer
Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information,
please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

On Privacy of Encrypted
Speech Communications
Ye Zhu, Member, IEEE, Yuanchao Lu, and Anil Vikram
Abstract—Silence suppression, an essential feature of speech communications over the Internet, saves bandwidth by disabling voice
packet transmissions when silence is detected. However, silence suppression enables an adversary to recover talk patterns from
packet timing. In this paper, we investigate privacy leakage through the silence suppression feature. More specifically, we propose a
new class of traffic analysis attacks to encrypted speech communications with the goal of detecting speakers of encrypted speech
communications. These attacks are based on packet timing information only and the attacks can detect speakers of speech
communications made with different codecs. We evaluate the proposed attacks with extensive experiments over different type of
networks including commercial anonymity networks and campus networks. The experiments show that the proposed traffic analysis
attacks can detect speakers of encrypted speech communications with high accuracy based on traces of 15 minutes long on average.
Index Terms—Traffic analysis, speaker detection, RTP.
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INTRODUCTION

this paper, we investigate privacy leakage through
silence suppression, an essential feature for speech
communications over the Internet. Speech communications
over the Internet are needed in a wide variety of Internet
applications such as audiocast [1], e-learning, Internet radio,
online chat, online gaming, and VoIP telephony. To save
bandwidth used for speech communications, the silence
suppression technique is designed to disable transmissions
of speech packets when silence is detected.
The increasing popularity of speech communications
over the Internet has brought a lot of attention and concern
over security and privacy issues of these speech communications. To protect confidentiality of speech communica
tions, tools and protocols such as Zfone [2], a tool capable to
encrypt voice packets, and SRTP [3], the secure version of
the realtime transport protocol (RTP), are developed or
implemented. To further protect privacy of speech commu
nications, advanced users are using anonymity networks to
anonymize speech communications. For this purpose, lowlatency anonymity networks such as Tor [4] and JAP [5] can
be used. One of the common anonymizing techniques used
in anonymity networks is rerouting which usually routes
packets through a randomly selected and usually longer
path instead of the shortest path.
In this paper, we propose a class of passive traffic
analysis attacks to compromise privacy of encrypted speech
N
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communications. The procedure of the proposed attacks is
as follows: First an adversary collects traces of encrypted
speech communications made by a speaker, say Alice. The
adversary then extracts application-level features of Alice’s
speech communications and trains a Hidden Markov Model
(HMM) with the extracted features. To test whether one
speech communication of interest is made by Alice, the
adversary can extract features from the trace of interest and
calculate the likelihood of the speech communication being
made by Alice. The proposed attacks can detect speakers of
encrypted speech communications with high probabilities.
In comparison with traditional traffic analysis attacks, the
proposed traffic analysis attacks are different in the
following aspects: 1) The proposed traffic analysis attacks
do not require simultaneous accesses to one traffic flow of
interest at both sides. 2) The attacks can detect speakers of
encrypted speech communications made with different
codecs.
The major difference between the new attacks and
previous traffic analysis attacks on speech communications
over the Internet is: Previous traffic analysis attacks are
based on packet size information and the new attacks
are based on packet timing information only. In this paper,
we assume packet size information is not available for traffic
analysis attacks because 1) voice packets generated by
constant bit rate (CBR) codecs are of the same size,
2) encryption can pad voice packets to the same size during
the encryption process, and 3) packets in anonymity networks such as Tor [4] are of the same size to prevent traffic
analysis attacks based on packet size information.
The contributions made in this paper are summarized
as follows:
.

We propose a class of traffic analysis attacks to
compromise privacy of encrypted speech commu
nications. The attacks are passive and based on the
HMM, a powerful tool to model temporal data. We
also propose a method to extract application-level
features from traffic flows for application-level
traffic analysis attacks.

TABLE 1
Major Parameters of G.729B Silence Detector

We evaluate the proposed traffic analysis attacks
through extensive experiments over the Internet and
commercial anonymity networks. For most of speech
communications made in the experiments, the two
communication parties are at least 20 hops away and
the end-to-end delay is at least 80 ms. Our experi
ments show that the traffic analysis attacks are able
to detect speakers of encrypted speech communica
tions with high probabilities based on only a small
amount of encrypted traffic.
. We propose intersection attacks to improve the
effectiveness of the proposed traffic analysis attacks.
. We discuss possible countermeasures to mitigate the
proposed traffic analysis attacks and analyze the
effect of the countermeasures on the quality of speech
communications.
The rest of the paper is organized as following: Section 2
reviews speech coding and silence suppression in speech
communications. In Section 3, we formally define the
problem. The details of the proposed traffic analysis attacks
are described in Section 4. In Section 5, we evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed traffic analysis attacks with
experiments on commercial anonymity networks. Section 6
describes speaker detection without the candidate pools. In
Section 7, we discuss possible countermeasures to mitigate
the proposed traffic analysis attacks. Section 8 reviews the
related work. We conclude the paper in Section 9.
.

2

BACKGROUND

In this section, we review the key principles in speech
coding and the silence suppression technique related to
both speech communications and the proposed traffic
analysis attacks.

2.1 Speech Coding
In speech communications, an analog voice signal is first
converted into a voice data stream by a chosen codec.
Typically in this step, compression is used to reduce the
data rate. The voice data stream is then packetized in
small units of typically tens of milliseconds of voice,
and encapsulated in a packet stream over the Internet.
In this paper, we focus on constant bit rate codecs since
most codecs used in current speech communications are
CBR codecs.1

idea of the silence suppression technique is to disable voice
packet transmissions when silence is detected. To prevent
the receiving end of a speech communication from suspect
ing that the speech communication stops suddenly, comfort
noise is generated at the receiving end. Silence suppression
is a general feature supported in codecs, speech commu
nication software, and protocols such as RTP.
A silence detector makes voice-activity decisions based
on the voice frame energy, equivalent to average voice
sample energy of a voice packet. If the frame energy is below
a threshold, the voice detector declares silence. Traditional
silence detectors [7] use fixed energy thresholds. Because of
the changing nature of background noise, adaptive energy
thresholds are used in modern silence detectors such as
NeVoT SD [9] and G.729B [10]. The major parameters of the
G.729B silence detector, one of the most popular silence
detectors, are listed in Table 1.
Hangover techniques are used in silence detectors to
avoid sudden end-clipping of speeches. During hangover
time, voice packets are still transmitted even when the frame
energy is below the energy threshold. Traditional silence
detectors use fixed-length hangover time. For modern silence
detectors such as G.729B, the length of hangover time
dynamically changes according to the energy of previous
frames and noise.
Fig. 1 shows an example of the silence suppression.
Fig. 1a shows the waveform of a sheriff’s voice signal
extracted from a video published at cnn.com [11]. Fig. 1b
shows the packet train generated by feeding the voice signal
to X-Lite [12], a popular speech communication tool. From
Fig. 1, we can easily observe the correspondence between
the silence periods in the voice signal and the gaps in the
packet train. The length of a silence period is different from
the length of the corresponding gap in the packet train
because of the hangover technique.
The proposed traffic analysis attacks exploit the silence
suppression technique. Different speakers have different
talk patterns in terms of talk spurts and silence gaps. For

2.2 Silence Suppression
Silence suppression, also called voice activity detection
(VAD), is designed to further save bandwidth. The main
1. Variable bit rate (VBR) codecs are primarily used for coding audio files
instead of real-time speech communications [6], [7]. Recently, there are
interests in using VBR codec such as Speex [8] for speech communications.
But majority of existing Internet applications uses CBR codecs for speech
communications. We believe the proposed traffic analysis attacks can also
be launched against speech communications using VBR codecs since silence
suppression is a general feature of speech codecs.

Fig. 1. An example of silence suppression.

example, some speakers speak very fast with only a couple
of short silence gaps while some speak with long silence
gaps. As shown in Fig. 1, an eavesdropper can learn a
speaker’s talk pattern from the packet timing. Based on talk
patterns learned from packet timing, the proposed traffic
analysis attacks can detect speakers of encrypted speech
communications with high accuracy.

3

PROBLEM DEFINITION

In this paper, we are interested in analyzing the traffic of
encrypted speech communications through anonymity net
works. We focus on detecting speakers of encrypted speech
communications by analyzing talk patterns, the applicationlevel patterns recovered from network traffic.
Speaker detection aims to detect the speaker of one specific
encrypted speech communication such as the presenter of a
presentation through audiocast or the instructor of an
e-learning course. For simplification, we assume that the
speaker of interest is Alice. To launch speaker detection
attacks, the adversary collects traces of Alice’s previous
encrypted speech communications in advance so that he or
she can detect whether Alice is the speaker in one specific
encrypted speech communication by comparing the trace of
the specific speech communication with the traces of Alice’s
previous speech communications.
In this paper, we assume: 1) The traces used in detection
can be collected at different time and in different network
environments. 2) Speech communications of interest can be
possibly made with different codecs.

3.1 Network Model
We assume Alice’s speech communications are encrypted
with one of the secure versions of the RTP protocol such as
SRTP [3] or ZRTP used in Zfone [2] to protect confidenti
ality of her speech communications.
To better protect privacy of her speech communications,
we assume Alice routes her encrypted speech communica
tions through anonymity networks. For better voice quality,
Alice can use low-latency anonymity networks2 such as Tor
[4] and JAP [5].
3.2 Threat Model
We focus on passive attacks in this paper. In other words,
the attacks launched by the adversary will not disturb
existing network traffic. In comparison with active attacks,
the proposed attacks are harder to be detected.
We assume that the adversary can access the links
connected to the callers to collect traces used for training.
This assumption is widely used in traffic analysis attacks
such as attacks on anonymity networks and tracing VoIP
calls [13], [14], [17], [18], [15]. The threat model is weaker than
the threaten models defined for traditional privacy-related
traffic analysis attacks: The threat model does not require
simultaneous access to the links connected to participants of
speech communications. Instead, we assume the adversary
2. Despite of the existing traffic analysis attacks [13], [14], [15], [16], lowlatency anonymity networks can still effectively protect communication
confidentiality and anonymity.

can collect Alice’s speech communication traces in advance
and use these collected traces to detect whether Alice is the
speaker of the speech communication of interest.
Our model is similar as the model for identifying a
human being by fingerprints: Fingerprints of human beings
are collected in advance by various means such as collecting
finger prints during the driver license applications. To
identify a specific person, the fingerprint of interest such as
a fingerprint in a crime scene will be compared against the
person’s fingerprints collected in advance.
As described in Section 1, we assume the packet size
information is not available for traffic analysis because of
the CBR codecs and the packet encryption. Since packet
encryption also prevents access to packet content by an
adversary, only packet timing information is available to an
adversary to launch privacy attacks.

3.3 Formal Definition
The goal of the proposed traffic analysis attacks is to identify
Alice’s speech communication trace from a pool of
candidate traces including the trace of Alice’s speech
communication. We define the pool size as the number of
candidate traces in the pool.3 The performance of the
speaker identification can be evaluated with detection rate,
false positive rate, and false negative rate. We define the
detection rate as the ratio of the number of successful
detections to the number of attempts. One detection is
defined as successful if Alice’s trace is correctly identified
from the pool and we defined attempt as one trial of
the identification. The false negative rate is defined as the
proportion of Alice’s speech communications that are
detected as speech communications made by other speakers.
The false positive rate is defined as the proportion of speech
communications made by other speakers that are detected
as Alice’s speech communications.

4

DETECTING SPEAKERS OF VOIP CALLS

In this section, we describe the traffic analysis attacks to
detect speakers of encrypted speech communications. We
begin the section with an overview of the proposed traffic
analysis attacks and then proceed with the details of each
step in the attacks.

4.1 Overview
The proposed traffic analysis attacks are based on packet
timing information only. As described in Section 2.2, the
silence suppression technique enables adversaries to re
cover talk patterns in terms of talk spurts and silence gaps
from packet timing. Adversaries can create a Hidden
Markov Model to model Alice’s talk pattern recovered
from her encrypted speech communications. When adver
saries want to determine which trace of encrypted speech
communications in a pool of candidate traces is made by
Alice, adversaries can check talk patterns recovered from
the candidate traces against Alice’s model.
3. The model without the assumption of the pool and the corresponding
performance evaluation are described in Section 6.

Fig. 2. Steps of the proposed attack.

The proposed attacks can be divided into two phases: the
training phase and the detection phase as shown in Fig. 2.
The two steps in the training phase are feature extraction
and HMM training. The detection phase consists of three
steps: feature extraction, speaker detection, and intersection
attack. The last step, the intersection attack, is optional. We
describe the details of each step below.

4.2 Feature Extraction
The input and the output of the feature extraction step are
raw traces of encrypted speech communications and feature
vectors, respectively. The feature vector used in the
proposed attacks is shown below
ts1
sg1

ts2
sg2

tsn
;
sgn

where tsi and sgj denote the length of the ith talk spurt and
the jth silent gap, respectively, and n is the length of a
feature vector.
Talk spurts and silent gaps are differentiated by a silence
threshold Tsilence : If an interpacket time (IPT) is larger
than the threshold, the IPT is declared as a silence gap.
Otherwise the IPT is declared as a part of one talk spurt.
Obviously the threshold Tsilence is critical to the overall
detection performance. Our initial experiments focus on
the suitable range of the threshold for detection: We code
voice signals with different codecs and collect generated
voice packets. Different values of the threshold Tsilence are
used to determine silence gaps. Actual silence gaps can be
found by checking the marker bits in RTP packets which
indicate the beginnings of talk spurts.4 We evaluate a value
of the threshold by two metrics: false positive rate and
false negative rate. The false positive rate of the silence test is
the fraction of talk spurts that are erroneously declared as
silence gaps. The false negative rate of the silence test is the
fraction of silences gaps that are erroneously declared as
talk spurts. The experiment results with different codecs5
are shown in Fig. 3.
We can observe that for a wide range of the threshold
Tsilence , both the false positive rate and the false negative
rate are low: When Tsilence is larger than 70 ms, the false
positive rates are below 10 percent for all the codecs. The
false negative rates are below 20 percent when Tsilence is less
than 100 ms. The range of the threshold Tsilence suitable for
silence tests is wide because of the big difference between
4. Only in our initial experiments, voice packets are not encrypted so that
we can determine actual silence gaps from marker bits and then find the
suitable range of the threshold for detection. For all the other experiments,
voice packets are encrypted and the proposed traffic analysis attacks have
no access to packet headers such as the marker bit in the RTP protocol.
5. Details of these codecs can be found in Table 2.

Fig. 3. Experiment results on the Threshold Tsilence .

IPTs of silent gaps and IPTs during talk spurts: Silence gaps
are in order of seconds. The length of the IPTs during talk
spurts is usually close to the packetization delay of 20 or
30 ms for most codecs.
We can also observe that increasing the threshold Tsilence
decreases the false positive rate and increases the false
negative rate. The changes in these two rates are again
because the IPTs of silence gaps are longer than the IPTs
during talk spurts.
A big challenge in feature extraction is to filter out the
noise caused by the random network delay in the silence
tests since the random network delay can cause incon
sistency in the silence tests based on voice packets collected
from different links on the path of a speech communication.
For example, an IPT during a talk spurt at the sending side
may be declared as a silence gap at the receiving side just
because the random network delays can possibly cause the
IPT to be larger than the threshold Tsilence . Obviously, the
inconsistency in silence tests will in turn degrade the
performance of the speaker detection based on voice
packets collected from different links on the path.
The main idea of filtering the noise caused by random
network delays in the silence tests is to determine a silence
gap based on N successive IPTs instead of one IPT. The
silence test with the filtering technique works as follows: If
one IPT is larger than the threshold Tsilence , we declare a
new silence gap only when none of the following
6
Tsilence
bpacketization
delayc - 1 IPTs are shorter than Tspurt , the thresh
old used to filter out long IPTs caused by the network delay.
The rationale behind the new silence test method is as
follows: If an IPT is erroneously declared as a silence gap
because the random network delay increases the length of
the IPT, then the following IPTs must likely be shorter than
the normal IPTs during talk spurts.
We compare the new silence test with the original silence
test through empirical experiments: The two communica
tion parties in a speech communication through the Internet
are at least 20 hops away from each other. In this set of
experiments, we evaluate the choices of the parameter Tspurt
with the match rate Rmatch
Rmatch ¼ fnumber of gaps found at both the sending side
and the receiving sideg=fnumber of gaps found
at the sending sideg:
ð1Þ
6. We use bc to denote the floor function.

Fig. 5. HMM.

Fig. 4. Match rate versus Threshold Tspurt (1law Codec).

Ideally, the match rate Rmatch should be 1 meaning that
silence gaps detected at the sending side can match silence
gaps detected at the receiving side exactly. The experiment
results are shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4 shows that the filtering technique can significantly
increase the match rate Rmatch : The original silence test can
only achieve a match rate of 0.21. The silence test with the
filtering technique can achieve a match rate of 0.99 when
Tspurt is between 3 and 20 ms. The match rate is low when
Tspurt is less than 0:3 ms because the threshold Tspurt is too
low to filter out large IPTs caused by network delays. The
match rate is also low when Tspurt is larger than 20 ms. It is
because normal IPTs during talk spurts are of 20 ms for the
1law codec and a threshold Tspurt larger than 20 ms filters
out most of actual silence gaps. In following experiments,
we set the threshold Tspurt to be 10 ms.
Feature vectors generated in this step are used for
training or detection in future steps.

4.3 HMM Training
The input and the output of this step are feature vectors and
trained HMMs, respectively.
The Markov Model is a tool to model a stochastic process
with the Markov property that the transition from the
current state to the next state depends only on the current
state and not on the past states. In a Hidden Markov Model,
the state is not directly visible, but outputs influenced by the
state are observed. Each state has a probability distribution
over the possible output. Therefore, the sequence of outputs
generated by an HMM gives some information about the
sequence of states. The HMM is a well-known tool to model
temporal data and it has been successfully used in temporal
pattern recognition such as speech recognition [19], hand
writing recognition [20], and gesture recognition [21]. In the
proposed attacks, HMMs are trained to model talk patterns
used for the speaker detection.
In our paper, we consider each talk period including
one talk spurt and the following silence gap as a hidden
(invisible) state. The output observation from one state is
the length of a talk spurt and the length of the following
silence gap. Since each state corresponds to a talk period, a
trace of one speech communication is a process going
through these hidden states. So we use HMMs to model
talk patterns. With the use of HMMs in our modeling, we
assume the Markov property holds. This assumption is
widely used in speech and language modeling. Even when

the assumption does not hold strictly, the extended HMM
can still work well [22].
The HMM used in traffic analysis attacks is the modified
left-right HMM [22] as shown in Fig. 5. It is based on leftright models because of the nonergodic nature of speech
signals [22], i.e., the attribute of signals whose properties
change over time. The fundamental property of all leftright HMMs is that the state transition coefficient from the
ith state to the jth state (denoted as aij ) is zero, when j is
less than i. Additional constraints are placed on the state
transitions in left-right models to make sure that large
changes in state indices do not occur, i.e., aij ¼ 0, when
j > i þ 6. For the well-known banded left-right model [22]
and Bakis model [23], 6 is 1 and 2, respectively.
We extended classical left-right models to allow transi
tions from the ith state to the ði þ 3Þth state, i.e., 6 ¼ 3, as
shown in Fig. 5. Our modification on the left-right model is
because of the possible false negative errors made in the
feature extraction step and the adaptive silence thresholds
used in silence detectors as described in Section 2:
False negative errors are made when some silent gaps are
not detected in feature extraction. The false negative errors
can be caused by a large threshold Tsilence or the hangover
time as described in Section 2. The hangover time reduces
the length of silence gaps recovered from the packet timing
since speech packets are still being sent during the beginning
and the end of a silence duration to avoid end clipping of
speeches. The reduction can cause false negative errors in
silence tests.
Adaptive silence thresholds used in silence detectors
can cause different silence detection results for the same
speech in different speech communications. For modern
codecs, the threshold used in a silence detector dynamically
changes to adapt to the changes in background noise.
Because of the dynamically changing threshold, one silent
gap in the same speech can be detected as silence in one
speech communication or as a part of a talk spurt in another
speech communication by the same codec. Although the
inconsistent detection results because of the adaptive
silence threshold are not very often observed, it can cause
low speaker detection performance.
To take into account the possible false negative errors
made in the feature extraction and the possible inconsis
tency of silence detectors, we allow state transitions from
the ith state to the (i þ 3)th state because up to three actual
neighboring talk periods can be detected as one talk period
in our analysis of speech communication traces. Our
experiments with different left-right models also show that
the modified left-right model can achieve better detection
performance than the other left-right models. In the

modified HMM, the number of states are heuristically set to
be 10 according to the length of feature vectors.7
We use Gaussian distributions to model the observation
distributions. The mean and variance of the Gaussian
distributions are estimated from the training data.
In this step, a speaker-specific model can be obtained by
training the HMM with traces of Alice’s speech commu
nications. The trained HMMs are used in the following
speaker detection step.

4.4 Speaker Detection
The inputs to this step are the Alice’s HMM trained in the
previous step and the feature vectors generated from a
pool of raw speech communication traces of interest. The
output of this step is the intermediate detection result, i.e.,
Ktop speakers from the candidate pool with talk patterns
closest to Alice’s talk pattern.
The detection step can be divided into two phases:
1) First, the likelihood of each feature vector is calculated
with the trained HMM. 2) The trace with the highest
likelihood is declared as Alice’s trace if the intersection
step is not used. To improve the detection accuracy, the
intermediate detection results can be fed into the optional
intersection attack step.
4.5 Intersection Attack
The intersection step is designed to improve detection
accuracy. The input to this step is the intermediate
detection result from the previous step. The output is a
final detection result.
The main idea of the intersection attack step is similar as
described in [24], [25], [26]: Instead of making a detection
decision based on one trial, we can improve detection
accuracy with a number of trials and the final detection
result is determined by combining (or intersecting) the
results from all trials.
More specifically, for the proposed attacks, suppose it is
possible to get m speech communication traces made by the
same speaker, m trials can generate m intermediate
detection results as described in Section 4.4. In other words,
from each trial, the adversary can obtain Ktop traces with the
Ktop highest likelihood values. The overall rank for each
speaker is calculated by adding up the ranks in the m trials.
The speaker with the highest rank is determined to be Alice.
A tie can be broken by comparing the sum of the likelihood
values in the m trials.
In summary, the proposed traffic analysis attacks can be
divided into two phases: the training phase and the
detection phase. Since the attack is based on the talk
patterns, the traffic analysis attacks are independent from
codecs used in speech communications. In other words, it is
possible to train HMMs with traces of speech communica
tions made with one codec and then use the trained HMMs
to detect speakers of speech communications made with
another codec. We evaluate the proposed traffic analysis
attacks with the empirical experiments described below.
7. Following the principle of Occam’s razor, the number of states should
be small enough to avoid overfitting and large enough to model the ergodic
nature of speech communications. We get similar detection performance for
different number of states when the number of states is larger than five.
When the number of state is too large, the training of HMMs fails to
converge to an optimal solution.

Fig. 6. Experiment Setup.

5

EMPIRICAL EVALUATION

In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
traffic analysis attacks with empirical experiments.

5.1 Experiment Setup
The experiment setup is as shown in Fig. 6. Speech packets
are first directed to the anonymity network managed by
findnot.com before arriving at the receiving side. We use
the commercial anonymous communication services pro
vided by findnot.com8 mainly because it is possible to select
entry points into the anonymity network [28]. In our
experiments, speech packets are directed through entry
points in England, Germany, and United States as shown in
Fig. 6. For these speech communications made through the
anonymity networks, the end-to-end delay is at least 80 ms
and the two communication parties are at least 20 hops
away from each other. About a quarter of the speech
communications are made through the campus network so
that traces of speech communications over different type of
networks are available for our experiments.
The audio signals are extracted from videos hosted on
Research Channels [29] and these audio signals can be
downloaded from [30]. Traces used in both training and
detection are 14.7 minutes long on average if not specified.9
At least three different speeches are available for each
speaker and the speeches are sent through four different
network entry points.10
We choose three popular and representative codecs of
high, medium, and low bit rates for our experiments. More
information about these three codecs is listed in Table 2.
For better training, all the traces used in training are
collected on the link connected to Alice’s computer. The
traces used in the detection phase can be collected on any
link in the path from the sending side to the receiving side.
The timing of packets collected on the link connected to the
receiving side is usually the noisiest due to the accumulated
randomness of the network delay. If not specified, the traces
used in the detection phase are all collected on the links
connected to the receiving side.
8. We did not use Tor [4] to anonymize speech communications because
Tor has no direct support of anonymizing UDP packets and in general,
speech communication packets are sent as UDP packets. Wang et al. [27]
experimented on the anonymous communication services provided by
find.com instead of Tor for the same reason.
9. For fair comparison, traces used in experiments should contain the
same number of talk periods. In other words, feature vectors generated
from these traces should be of the same size. Because of the difference in the
length of talk periods in different traces, traces used in experiments are of
different length in minutes.
10. The campus network entry point is one of the choices.

TABLE 2
Codec Information

5.2 Metrics
We use detection rate to measure the effectiveness of the
proposed attacks. In this paper, the detection rate is defined
as the ratio of the number of successful detections to the
number of attempts.
For speaker detection with traces generated by the same
1
codec, the detection rate for a random guess is about 109
,
because in each trial, there are around 109 candidate traces
in the pool if the pool size is not specified. One of the traces
in the pool is the “right” trace, i.e., Alice’s trace. In each trial
of speaker detection, one trace of Alice’s speech is used as
one of the candidate traces and Alice’s traces generated
from Alice’s other speeches are used for training.
If not explicitly specified, all detection rates reported in
this section are averaged over experiments of all possible
combinations of the training traces and the candidate traces.
In all the experiments below, the training traces and the
candidate traces are all collected from different speech
communications.
5.3 Threshold Tsilence
This series of experiments are designed to test the effect of
the parameter Tsilence , the threshold used in silence tests.
Fig. 7 shows the speaker detection performance with
different values of the threshold Tsilence . Each detection rate
in Fig. 7 is obtained based on 120 trials with 109 traces in the
candidate pool. The length of traces used in both training
and detection is 14.7 minutes on average.
From Fig. 7, we can observe: 1) The detection rate for
speaker detection can reach 0.32, about 35-fold improve
ment over a random guess, when the size of the candidate
pool is 109. 2) In general, the detection rate increases when
the threshold Tsilence increases. When Tsilence becomes large,
the detection rate may drop simply because shorter feature
vectors are used for training and detection. When Tsilence is
larger than 0:512 s, feature vectors are too short for
detection so that the HMM training cannot converge for
certain traces. 3) The detection rate for candidate traces
collected from the sending end is comparable with the

Fig. 7. Speaker detection performance with different Threshold Tsilence .

detection rate for candidate traces collected from the
receiving end. It is because the filtering technique used in
the silence test can largely filter out noise caused by the
random network delay at the receiving end. In the
following experiments, we set Tsilence to be 0.412 seconds.

5.4 Length of Training and Test Traces
This set of experiments is designed to investigate the effect
of the length of the training and the test traces on the
detection performance. Since in general, training traces
should be longer than test traces for better training, we
vary the average length of the training traces from 5.4 to
14.7 minutes and the average length of the test traces varies
from 1.9 minutes to the average length of the training
traces used in the same detection.
From experiment results shown in Fig. 8, we can observe
that even for five-minute-long training and test traces, the
detection rate for the speaker detection can achieve 0.12,
about 13-fold improvement over a random guess. Fig. 8 also
shows that the detection rate increases with the length of
training traces and the length of test traces. In the following
experiments, we fix the average length of the training traces
and the test traces to be 14.7 minutes.
5.5 Pool Size
In this set of experiments, we investigate the detection
performance with different sizes of the candidate pool.
From the experiment results shown in Fig. 9, we can
observe that when the pool size increases, the detection rate
slightly decreases for all the codecs. The reason is that it is
harder to find the right one from a larger pool. But the ratio
between the speaker detection rate and the detection rate of
a random guess changes from 12 to 37, when the pool size
changes from 28 to 109. It means that the traffic analysis
attacks are more effective when the pool size is larger. We
can also observe that for the 1law codec, one of the most
frequently used codecs in speech communications, the
detection rate can reach 0.42 when the pool size is 28,
approximately 37-fold improvement over a random guess.

Fig. 8. Speaker detection performance with different length of training
traces and test traces.

Fig. 10. Cross-codec detection performance with different length of
training trace and test traces.

5.6 Cross-Codec Detection
In this set of experiments, the training traces and the traces
to be detected are generated with different codecs. We
believe this set of experiments is important because:
1) Practically training traces and the traces to be detected
can be collected from speech communications made with
different codecs. 2) Since speech packets are encrypted and
possibly padded to a fixed length, adversaries may not be
able to differentiate speech communications made with
different codecs.
In this set of experiments, the threshold Tsilence is set to
0.412 s. If the size of the candidate pool is not specified, then
there are around 325 candidate traces in the pool including
the “right” trace. So the detection rate for a random guess is
1
about 325
. In each trial of the speaker detection, one trace of
Alice’s speech is used as one of the candidate traces and
Alice’s traces generated from Alice’s other speeches are
used for training. If the length of the traces used for training
and detection are not specified, then the length of these
traces is 14.7 minutes on average.
Fig. 10 shows the detection performance with different
length of training traces and test traces. We can again
observe that the detection rate increases with the length of
training traces and test traces. The detection rate of the
speaker detection with only five minutes of training traces
and test traces can reach 0.12, about 40-fold improvement
over a random guess.
Fig. 11 shows the detection performance with different
sizes of the candidate pool. We can observe that the
detection rate decreases slightly with the increase of pool
size. When the pool size is 82, the detection rate can reach
0.60. By comparing the performance results shown in Fig. 9
with the performance results shown in Fig. 11, we can also
observe that even for larger pool sizes, the detection rate for

the cross-codec detection is higher than the single-codec
detection. It is mainly because more traces are available for
training HMMs in the cross-codec detection and only traces
made by the same codec are available for training in the
single-codec detection.

Fig. 9. Detection performance with different pool sizes.

5.7 Intersection Attack
In this set of experiments, we evaluate the effectiveness of
the intersection attacks on the cross-codec speaker detec
tion. On average, there are 37 candidate speakers in each
1
trial. So the detection rate for a random guess is about 37
.
Each candidate speaker has nine traces available for
detection. So the final detection result is obtained by
combining the intermediate detection results of nine trials.
In this set of experiments, the length of traces used for
training and detection is 14.7 minutes long on average and
Tsilence ¼ 0:412 s.
Table 3 shows the performance of the intersection attack:
First, the intersection attacks greatly improve the perfor
mance of the cross-codec speaker detection. Second, the
detection rate can reach 0.625, about 25-fold improvement
over a random guess.
In summary, the proposed traffic analysis attacks can
detect speakers of encrypted speech communications with
high accuracy based on traces of about 15 minutes long
on average.
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DETECTING SPEAKER WITHOUT CANDIDATE
POOLS

The initial threat model assumes that the “right” speaker is
in the candidate pool. Although the assumption is valid for
applications similar as identifying a human being with a
group of fingerprints collected from a crime scene, we
would like to investigate the detection performance with
out the assumption of the candidate pool. Instead, we

Fig. 11. Cross-codec detection performance with different pool sizes.

3.

TABLE 3
Performance of Intersection Attacks Combined
with Cross-Codec Speaker Detection

assume that the adversary possesses traces of speech
communications made by Alice and other speakers. We
call these traces as labeled traces since these traces
are collected in advance and the adversary knows the
identities of the speakers. The goal of the adversary is to
detect whether Alice is the speaker of a speech commu
nication of interest.

6.1 Detection Approach
We modify the detection approach for the new traffic
analysis attack as follows:
1.

2.

The adversary splits the labeled traces of Alice’s
speech communications into two halves. An HMM
to model Alice’s talk pattern is established based on
the first half of the traces.
A detection threshold Tlik is determined based on
the remaining labeled traces including the second
half of the labeled traces of Alice’s speech commu
nications. The adversary evaluates each of these
traces against Alice’s model and calculates its like
lihood. Given a threshold Tlik , the adversary calcu
lates the false positive rate and the false negative rate
on the remaining labeled traces as follows: a) False
negative rate is defined as the proportion of Alice’s
speech communications detected as speech commu
nications made by other speakers, i.e., the proportion
of Alice’s speech communications with likelihood
values less than Tlik . b) False positive rate is defined
as the proportion of speech communications made
by other speakers detected as Alice’s speech com
munications, i.e., the proportion of other speakers’
traces with likelihood values larger than Tlik . The
threshold Tlik is selected so that the detection rates
on the remaining labeled traces are maximized and
both the false negative rate and the false positive rate
on the remaining labeled traces are below a tolerance
threshold Ttol .

Fig. 12. Detection performance.

The adversary makes a detection decision by
evaluating a given trace with Alice’s HMM. If the
calculated likelihood is larger than Tlik , the given
trace is declared as Alice’s trace. Otherwise, the trace
is declared as a trace made by another speaker.

6.2 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the detection performance with four metrics:
detection rate, false negative rate, false positive rate, and
percentage of traces which can be tested. The two metrics,
the false negative rate and the false positive rate used in
performance evaluation, are calculated on the test traces.
The last metric, percentage of traces which can be tested, is
needed because for certain group of labeled traces, it is
impossible to find a threshold Tlik so that both the false
negative rate and the false positive rate on the labeled traces
are below a given tolerance Ttol .
In this set of experiments, the average length of labeled
traces and test traces are 14.7 minutes. In each detection
attempt, there are 54 labeled traces and six Alice’s traces.
The experiment results are averaged over 120 tests.
Experiment results shown in Fig. 12 indicate that the
detection rate decreases when the tolerance Ttol increases
and in the mean time, the percentage of trace which can be
tested increases. A smaller tolerance Ttol means better
training, and in turn, better detection performance. A
smaller tolerance Ttol also means stricter requirements so
fewer traces can be tested. We can also observe that the
detection rate can reach 0.89 when Ttol ¼ 0:1 and only
one percent traces can be tested. When Ttol ¼ 1, i.e., all the
traces can be tested, the detection rate is 0.63.
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DISCUSSION

From the experiment results shown above, it is apparent
that the proposed traffic analysis attacks can greatly
compromise the privacy of encrypted speech communica
tions. Countermeasures are needed for privacy protection.
In this section, we discuss possible countermeasures which
can protect privacy with only marginal effect on the quality
of service (QoS) of speech communications.
Simple countermeasures to the proposed traffic analysis
attacks include padding speech traffic to constant rate traffic
or randomly delaying speech packets to hide talk patterns.
These simple approaches may render the proposed traffic

Fig. 13. Countermeasure: Camouflaging Alice’s speech communication.

analysis attacks ineffective. But these approaches can cause
significant waste of bandwidth or degrade the QoS of
speech communications significantly.
A better approach is to camouflage the timing of Alice’s
speech packets according to another speaker’s trace. As
shown in Fig. 13, Alice’s speech packets are first kept in a
buffer. A token will be generated when it is time to send a
packet according to Speaker X’s trace. The transmissions of
Alice’s speech packets are controlled by these tokens. The
transmission control in Fig. 13 functions as follows:
Each packet transmission consumes a token.
When a token is generated and the buffer is not
empty, the transmission control will transmit the
first packet in the buffer.
3. When a token is generated and the buffer is empty, a
dummy packet is transmitted by the transmission
control.
4. When Nbuf f packets are held in the buffer and no
token is available, the first packet in the buffer will
be transmitted.
For the proposed countermeasure, dummy packets are
sent only when necessary for camouflaging. The parameter
Nbuf f is used to control the queuing delay. This parameter
should be carefully chosen to balance the QoS of speech
communications and the privacy protection to defeat traffic
analysis attacks.
The two metrics used in our initial analysis of the
countermeasure are: 1) The detection rate defined in Sec
tion 5.2: It is used to measure the performance of the privacy
protection of speech communications. 2) Additional packet
delay caused by the countermeasure: It measures the
degradation of the QoS of speech communications.
In this set of experiments, we use real speech commu
nication traces collected from the experiment environment
described in Section 5.1.
1.
2.

Fig. 14. Performance of the possible countermeasure.

Fig. 14 shows the performance of the countermeasure.
The threshold Tsilence is set to 0.412 s in this series of
experiments. Fig. 14a shows that the countermeasure can
protect the privacy of speech communications since most
detection rates are around the probability of a random
guess. Fig. 14b shows the additional packet delays caused
by the countermeasure. When Nbuf f is 50 and 100, the
additional delays caused by the countermeasure are less
than 36 and 68 ms with a probability larger than 0.95,
respectively. So the countermeasure will not cause any
significant change in the quality of speech communications
since the additional delays for Nbuf f ¼ 50 and Nbuf f ¼ 100
are still less than one third of and half of the delay budget
for speech communications [31], respectively. The detection
rates for small Nbuf f , such as Nbuf f ¼ 1 and Nbuf f ¼ 10,
cannot be obtained from experiments, because Nbuf f is too
small and no silence gaps can be found in the speech
communication traces.
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RELATED WORK

In this section, we review privacy-related traffic analysis
attacks at the application level and describe the relation
between the proposed attack based on packet timing and
side channel attacks on a cryptosystem to recover a
cryptographic key.
The application-level traffic analysis attacks target at
disclosing sensitive information at the application level.
Song et al. [32] found that despite encryption and
authentication mechanisms used in SSH, it is possible to
obtain interkeystroke timing information from SSH packets
since SSH sends out each keystroke in one separate packet
during the interactive mode. Based on the interkeystroke
timing information, they demonstrated that it was possible
to reveal passwords used in SSH logins. Sun et al. [33] gave a
quantitative analysis for identifying a webpage even if
encryption and anonymizing proxies are used. They took
advantage of the fact that a number of HTTP features such
as the number and size of objects can be used as signatures
to identify webpages with some accuracy. Unless the
anonymizer addresses this, these signatures are visible to
the adversary. Herrmann et al. [34] proposed to identify
websites by applying common text mining techniques to the
normalized frequency distribution of observable IP packet
sizes. Lu et al. [35] showed the feasibility of website
fingerprinting based on packet ordering information.

Wright et al. [36] showed packet size information of VoIP
packets can be used by an adversary to identify a spoken
phrase in VoIP calls. In [37], it was shown that packet size
information of VoIP packets could also be used to detect
languages used in conversations even the conversations
were encrypted.
The application-level traffic analysis attacks can be
classified into two categories based on features of the
network traffic used in these attacks. Most existing
application-level traffic analysis attacks are based on packet
size information [33], [34], [36], [35]. Wright et al. [38]
proposed approaches to counter traffic analysis attacks on
VoIP calls and their approaches are based on modifying
packet sizes. Only a few application-level traffic analysis
attacks are based on packet timing only. One example is the
keystroke detection based on SSH packets [32].
The traffic analysis attacks proposed in this paper are
based on packet timing information only since 1) CBR
codecs generate voice packets of the same size and
2) encryption can easily pad voice packets to the same size
during the encryption process. The countermeasure dis
cussed in Section 7 protects communication privacy by
modifying packet timing so that the original talk patterns
can be camouflaged.
Concurrently with our research, Backes et al. [39]
proposed an approach to detect speakers by measuring
distance between distributions of silence gaps and talk
spurts and the comparable detection performance is
reported in [39]. The major differences between our traffic
analysis attacks and the attacks proposed by Backes et al.
[39] are: 1) Our attacks can filter out the noise caused by the
random network delay so that the traces to be detected can
be collected even from the last hop of a speech commu
nication path. Extensive experiments show that the attacks
are effective even for international speech communications
routed through the commercial anonymity networks. 2) Our
attacks are effective to compromise privacy of encrypted
speech communications with different codecs and we
evaluate the attacks with the cross-codec detection experi
ments. The capability of cross-codec detection is desired
since encrypted speech communications prevent attackers
from knowing codecs in use and different codecs are used
in different network settings.
Conceptually the timing-based traffic analysis attacks
proposed in this paper are similar as classical timing attacks
[40], [41], [42], [43] on cryptosystems, one type of sidechannel attacks. In Kocher’s seminal paper [40], it was
shown that the timing information of private key operations
can be used to compromise secret keys. In this paper,
similarly we show that timing information of encrypted
speech communication systems can be used to compromise
privacy of encrypted speech communications. More speci
fically, the proposed traffic analysis attacks use the packet
timing information to detect speakers of encrypted speech
communications. A slight difference between these two
types of timing attacks is: Usually classical timing attacks on
cryptosystems are implementation-specific, i.e., exploiting
the implementation of a cipher instead of the internals of a
cipher. The timing attacks proposed in this paper exploit
silence suppression, an essential feature of speech commu
nications to save bandwidth.
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CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we propose a class of passive traffic analysis
attacks to compromise privacy of speech communications.

The proposed attacks are based on application-level
features extracted from speech communication traces. We
evaluated the proposed attacks by extensive experiments
over different types of networks including commercial
anonymity networks and the campus network. The experi
ments show that the proposed traffic analysis attacks can
detect speakers of encrypted speech communications with
high detection rates based on speech communication traces
of 15 minutes long on average.
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